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Abstract 
Kuhn (1977) claimed that several algorithms can be defended to select the best 
theory based on epistemic values such as simplicity, accuracy, and fruitfulness. In a 
recent paper, Okasha (2011) argued that no theory choice algorithm exists which 
satisfies a set of intuitively compelling conditions that Arrow (1963) had proposed 
for a consistent aggregation of individual preference orderings. In this paper, we put 
forward a solution to avoid this impossibility result. Based on previous work by 
Gaertner and Xu (2012), we suggest to view the theory choice problem in a cardinal 
context and to use a general scoring function defined over a set of qualitative verdicts 
for every epistemic value. This aggregation method yields a complete and transitive 
ranking and the rule satisfies all Arrovian conditions appropriately reformulated 
within a cardinal setting. We also propose methods that capture the aggregation 
across different scientists. 
 
  
                                                          
1  We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments regarding the presentation 
of our overall argument. Furthermore, Claus Beisbart, Georg Brun, Kamilla Buchter, Gregory 
Fried, Stephan Güttinger, Paul Hoyingen-Huene, Jurgis Karpus, Simon Lohse, Alex Marcoci, 
James Nguyen, and Mantas Radzvilas provided fruitful feedback on earlier versions of this paper. 
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1. Introduction 
Scientists face situations in which they have to choose among competing 
theories. Kuhn’s (1977) paper is still providing the relevant stage-setting for 
discussing theory choice. Kuhn claimed that a variety of epistemic values, most 
importantly scope, fruitfulness, accuracy, simplicity, and consistency, influence 
theory choice. However, he rejected the idea that there is a unique algorithm to 
amalgamate the information provided by these criteria (Kuhn 1977, 322, 326). 
Okasha (2011) gave a new twist to this debate. He proposed an analogy between 
social choice and theory choice. Given the analogy holds, a troubling impossibility 
result emerges: there exists no aggregation procedure which yields a complete and 
transitive ranking of the alternatives considered and which satisfies a set of 
intuitively compelling conditions. Hence, it seems that Kuhn’s argumentation has to 
be reconsidered what primarily motivated this paper.  
We suggest a way to avoid Okasha’s impossibility result by viewing the theory 
choice problem in a cardinal context. By doing so, we pick up a suggestion which 
was made by Okasha in the latter part of his paper, namely to enrich the 
informational basis of the analysis to allow for inter-criteria comparability. Okasha 
refers to Sen (1977, 1986) who argued that some degree of interpersonal 
comparability is needed in order to get out of Arrow’s impossibility impasse. This 
shift in the problem description allows us to use a tool which has been successfully 
applied in the social choice context, i.e. scoring rules. We argue that a general 
scoring rule characterised by Gaertner and Xu (2012) is flexible enough to 
illuminate, and hopefully solve, the problem of theory choice. This general scoring 
rule uses a set of qualitative verdicts. These take into account ordinal information 
from the epistemic values as well as information about the epistemic projects 
pursued in the process of constructing and evaluating theories. Furthermore, these 
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qualitative verdicts permit, so our argumentation goes, a meaningful comparison 
across different criteria that are used to evaluate alternative theories. This inter-
criteria comparability allows us then to avoid Arrow’s (1963) and Okasha’s 
impossibility result in a cardinal context. To be more precise, given a finite number 
of epistemic values and three or more alternative theories, the aggregation method 
we propose yields a complete and transitive ranking within a cardinal setting and 
thus satisfies Arrow’s rationality postulate together with ‘his’ four conditions of 
unrestricted domain, weak Pareto, non-dictatorship, and independence of irrelevant 
alternatives appropriately reformulated for cardinal values. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we revisit Kuhn’s discussion of theory 
choice (section 2). Secondly, we briefly recall Okasha’s reconstruction of Kuhn and 
refer to some very recent discussion (section 3). Thirdly, we introduce the basic idea 
of our solution, present a formal characterisation, and show how our proposal 
satisfies the Arrovian conditions in a cardinal context (section 4). Fourthly, we 
discuss what our solution reveals about the aggregation across different scientists 
(section 5). 
 
2. Revisiting Kuhn’s discussion of theory choice 
We revisit Kuhn’s discussion of theory choice for two reasons. First, we want 
to state precisely what we take the problem of theory choice to be. Secondly, this 
discussion allows us to clarify in section 4 what, from our point of view, the status of 
a solution of the theory choice problem is. 
Let us begin with the problem of theory choice. We take Kuhn’s key claim to 
be the following: Given a finite set of theories X with more than one element and a 
finite set of epistemic values 𝑁 (containing accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, 
and fruitfulness), different scientists can arrive at more than one ranking of the 
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alternatives even if they agree that the evaluation should be done solely with 
reference to the set 𝑁. This is tantamount to saying that there is more than one 
algorithm to determine the overall ranking of the alternative theories based on the 
epistemic values (Kuhn 1977, 322, 326). 
This formulation entails two important clarifications of what we take to be the 
problem of theory choice. First, we are setting aside two arguments in Kuhn’s earlier 
writings. The first argument can be put as follows: Theories, more precisely 
paradigms, come equipped with standards for assessing theories. These standards can 
vary across different paradigms. Hence, there is no unique way of choosing between 
paradigms (Kuhn 1996, 6, 141). The second argument goes like this: Even if there 
are shared standards for assessing paradigms, paradigms do not solve an identical set 
of problems. Accordingly, if one chooses between two or more paradigms, one has to 
weigh the importance of the problems against each other. Hence, there is no unique 
way of choosing between paradigms (Kuhn 1996, 85, 103; Hoyningen-Huene 1993, 
242). Therefore, we only deal with the situation in which the set of problems as well 
as the standards of theory evaluation are shared.2 
This leaves us with the following two arguments of Kuhn. To start, epistemic 
values can be interpreted differently by the scientists who are involved in the 
evaluation process (Kuhn 1977, 322). Hence, it is possible that two scientists, who 
are committed to the same set of epistemic values, come up with different rankings 
of the alternatives under consideration (Hoyningen-Huene 1993, 236). Furthermore, 
the epistemic values can be weighed differently by scientists who are evaluating 
theories (Kuhn 1977, 322; Hoyningen-Huene 1993, 236). The commitment to the 
same set of values does not entail or presuppose a commitment about their relative 
                                                          
2  We take it to be the case that Okasha (2011) as well as the replies in the literature, which will be 
discussed below, share this focus. It is worthwhile to note that thereby Kuhn’s discussion of 
methodological incommensurability is left aside. 
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weight. Hence, it is again possible that two scientists, who are committed to the same 
set of epistemic values, come up with different rankings of the alternatives under 
consideration. 
Secondly, the formulation entails a particular view regarding the level at which 
the problem of theory choice is located. To be more precise, is the theory choice 
problem an issue on the level of individual scientists or the scientific community? 
This is a tricky issue, but we think the problem occurs on both levels. Kuhn’s own 
remarks on this give a somewhat mixed picture: 
 
“(…) it is the community of specialists rather than its individual members that 
makes the effective decision.” (Kuhn 1996, 200) 
 
“(…) shared values can be important determinants of group behaviour even 
though the members of the group do not all apply them in the same way.” 
(Kuhn 1996, 186, our emphasis) 
 
How do we have to understand these remarks about decision making on the group 
level and how is it related to decision making of individual scientists? 
We follow Hoyingen-Huene’s (1993) interpretation here. Accordingly, the 
most relevant debate occurs on the level of the individual scientist. The choice of an 
individual scientist is influenced but not determined by the epistemic values. The 
individual scientist chooses a preferred theory and invests her energy in its 
development. Which theory comes out on top in the scientific community is 
determined by a historical process consisting of the choices of individual scientists 
(Hoyningen-Huene 1993, 153-154). Subsequently, we first focus on the choice 
situation of an individual scientist (sections 3-4). Based on our procedure for this 
situation, we then discuss the aggregation across different scientists (section 5).3 
  
                                                          
3  Note that Weber (2011) offers an alternative interpretation of Kuhn. He views Kuhn as a social 
epistemologist (ibid., 3) who treats the scientific community level as the relevant decision making 
entity (ibid., 7). Accordingly, he would reject our two step approach to the choice problem. 
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3. Okasha’s Arrovian reconstruction of Kuhn and beyond 
Since Okasha’s paper is now fairly widely discussed, we will be brief here, 
solely remind the reader of the basic set-up and use the opportunity to introduce 
some notation. 
Okasha treats each of Kuhn’s epistemic values (simplicity, accuracy, 
fruitfulness, consistency, and scope) as if it were an individual with a preference 
ordering over the alternative theories. To be more precise, every epistemic value can 
be viewed as a decision criterion 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 (where N is the set of relevant criteria) 
which can be expressed as a binary relation 𝑅𝑛 (e.g. ‘is at least as simple as’, ‘has at 
least the scope as’) defined on the set of alternative theories X. Each binary relation 
𝑅𝑛 imposes a weak ordering on X, i.e. it is reflexive, transitive, and complete 
(Okasha 2011, 91). 
Given this framework, Kuhn’s algorithm can be expressed as a theory choice 
rule (ibid., 92). A theory choice rule is a mapping from the set of all logically 
possible combinations of weak orderings (𝑅1, … , 𝑅𝑛, … , 𝑅𝑡) to a single weak 
ordering 𝑅∗ which is the aggregate relation defined on the set of alternative theories 
𝑋 and interpreted as “is at least as good as”. 
According to Okasha, all five requirements that Arrow (1963) postulated in his 
path-breaking work on the nonexistence of a social welfare function have to be met 
by a theory choice rule (ibid.). First of all, the aggregate relationship has to be a weak 
ordering, i.e. the aggregate relationship has to be transitive and complete. This is a 
requirement of collective rationality. Then the postulate of an unrestricted domain 
(U) means that the theory choice rule should yield an overall ranking 𝑅∗ for all 
logically possible combinations of 𝑡-tuples of binary relations 𝑅n (ibid.). The 
requirement of the weak Pareto principle (P) states that if theory 𝑇1 does better than 
another theory 𝑇2 with respect to all considered epistemic values 1 … , 𝑛, … , 𝑡, then 𝑇1 
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should be preferred to 𝑇2 overall (ibid.). Arrow’s non-dictatorship (D) requirement 
states that there is no epistemic value such that if this value ranks, for all profiles of 
preference rankings, any 𝑇1 above any other 𝑇2 , 𝑇1 is ranked automatically above 𝑇2 
in the overall ranking (ibid., 93). Finally, the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(I) condition requires that the overall ranking of any 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 depends only on how 
the epistemic values rank 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 and not on how they rank other theories in 
relation to 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 (ibid.). 
For this reconstruction of the theory choice problem, Arrow’s famous 
impossibility result applies: For a finite number of epistemic values and at least three 
alternative theories, there exists no theory choice function satisfying conditions U, P, 
D, and I (ibid.). 
Okasha’s result has stimulated a variety of replies (Morreau 2013, 2015; Rizza 
2014; Stegenga 2015; Weber 2011). All of them focus on the conditions which need 
to be fulfilled by a satisfactory aggregation mechanism according to the analogy to 
social choice theory. Weber (2011) suggests that the non-dictatorship assumption 
cannot be defended in the case of theory choice. Specifically, fruitfulness (defined as 
the capability to provide problem solutions) has to be viewed as a dictatorial criterion 
amongst the epistemic values. Morreau (2013; 2015) argues that the assumption of 
unrestricted domain does not hold for theory choice. Rizza (2014) argues that 
Okasha’s result disappears if one uses the correct information encoded in the ordinal 
information of the epistemic criteria. In the situation of three alternative theories, 
using sequenced triples instead of triples of pairs of alternatives as input for the 
aggregation process avoids the potential for an intransitive overall ranking. Finally, 
Stegenga (2015) claims that Okasha’s own solution, namely to enrich the 
information which can be fed into the aggregation mechanism, fails. The complexity 
and diversity of the epistemic values does not generally allow expressing more than 
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ordinal information. Our solution strategy is in contrast to Stegenga’s claim. We take 
up Okasha’s idea to enrich the informational basis and propose a solution that allows 
for inter-criteria comparability within a cardinal set-up. 
 
4. A new approach: Using scoring functions over qualitative verdicts to 
establish comparability of theory choice criteria 
Now that the stage has been set, we propose our solution to avoid the Arrovian 
impossibility result in the case of theory choice. First, we introduce the basic idea 
with the help of a decision situation in a committee (section 4.1). Secondly, we 
explain how this basic idea can be made fruitful for the problem of theory choice. In 
particular, we motivate a reformulation of the theory choice problem in a cardinal 
context (section 4.2). Thirdly, we capture the basic idea formally and highlight 
intuitively attractive features of this rule. Here, we also show how this rule is able to 
fulfil all of the appropriately reformulated Arrovian conditions in a cardinal context 
(section 4.3). Finally, we further clarify our proposal by spelling out the notion of 
context-dependency (section 4.4). 
Before going on, let us specify what, from our point of view, the status of a 
solution to the theory choice problem is. 
As we saw at the end of the last section, a common attempt to circumvent 
Arrow’s impossibility result is to relax one of the requirements for the aggregation 
mechanism (U, P, D, and I). Stegenga (2015) nicely highlights that such a move 
requires a stance on what the standards are for evaluating these requirements (ibid., 
265). He introduces three possible standards (ibid.): 
(a) Normative adequacy (theory choice ought to satisfy the requirement) 
(b) Complete descriptive accuracy (theory choice always satisfies the 
requirement) 
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(c) Partial descriptive accuracy (theory choice sometimes satisfies the 
requirement)  
Stegenga’s reflections also apply to our proposal. Is our solution meant to be a 
descriptively (fully or partially) accurate picture of theory choices in the sciences? Or 
is it a normative proposal stating how theory choices should be done in the sciences? 
We do not aim at providing a descriptively accurate account of theory choice 
processes in the sciences. By this we mean that we are not claiming that scientists 
necessarily form their beliefs and come to their judgments as specified in our 
aggregation procedure. However, we do understand our procedure as a rational 
reconstruction of theory choice processes. To be more precise, our procedure belongs 
in the normative domain to the extent that it either can be viewed as one of multiple 
possible prescriptive procedures to arrive at an overall judgment in theory choice 
processes, or as a standard to judge outcomes of theory choice processes. 
 
4.1 The basic idea 
 
Imagine you are one of the members of a committee that has to decide among a 
certain number of research proposals for funding. Let us suppose that 𝑘 proposals 
were submitted. Let us further assume that the chairperson of your committee comes 
forward with the following procedure. She declares that there are 𝑚 categories (from 
excellent to fail, let us say, with 𝑚 − 2 categories in between), with rank scores from 
𝑚 to 1 attached to these categories. The chairperson asks all members of your 
committee to allocate the 𝑘 proposals to the 𝑚 available categories. It is explicitly 
not required that every member comes up with a strict ordering and that all 
categories have to be filled by each and every committee member. Furthermore, the 
chairperson announces that, as soon as each member has assigned the 𝑘 proposals to 
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the 𝑚 categories, she would count the rank numbers assigned to each proposal and 
then construct a ranking over the 𝑘 proposals from the highest rank sum to the 
lowest, the proposal with the highest aggregate sum being the winner, though more 
than one proposal may be selected depending on the available budget. We claim that 
this aggregation procedure can be made fruitful for the theory choice case. Let us 
flesh out this analogy in more detail. 
 
4.2 Transferring the basic idea to the problem of theory choice 
 
In the above scenario, replace the research proposals with alternative theories, 
the members of the committee with Kuhn’s epistemic values, and the chairperson 
with an individual scientist. Furthermore, consider a set of discrete verdicts 
corresponding to the categories: ‘very high’, ‘high’, ‘satisfactory’, ‘just sufficient’, 
and ‘insufficient’.4 This yields the following set-up for theory choice: A scientist 
considers the alternative theories in light of the epistemic values. For each epistemic 
value, she independently assigns to the alternative theories a qualitative verdict (e.g. 
‘𝑇1 is sufficiently accurate’, ‘𝑇2’s accuracy is very high’). The five qualitative 
verdicts constitute a discrete scale with rank scores. The overall ranking of the 
theories is determined by the sum of rank scores of each alternative theory. 
Drawing this parallel between the case of the committee and the problem of 
theory choice amounts to switching to a cardinal description of the theory choice 
problem. Note that the epistemic values, such as simplicity or accuracy, are assumed 
to only provide ordinal information in our proposal. The introduction of qualitative 
verdicts, and their respective expression in rank scores, is, hence, an additional step, 
                                                          
4  We will say more about the details of this scale. For the moment, the reader should not be irritated 
by the facts that we specify an exact number of grades and choose a particular formulation of the 
qualitative verdicts. 
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which needs to be justified. By taking this step, we do not propose to solve Okasha’s 
problem in an ordinal context. Furthermore, note that the general scoring rule which 
was introduced in the committee case is not identical to the Borda rule, since it does 
not presuppose that the epistemic values always provide a strict ordering of the 
alternative theories. 
The presence of a cardinal scale is, in our point of view, an accurate description 
of theory choice situations for the following reasons. Theory choice does not take 
place in a vacuum. Rather, scientists are evaluating competing theories with respect 
to broad epistemic projects they are conducting in a discipline or a sub-discipline. 
For example, in engineering such a broad epistemic project could consist in building 
more efficient combustion engines. In molecular biology, a broad epistemic project 
could consist in synthesizing new functional germs. Finally, in astrophysics a broad 
epistemic project could be the understanding of the distribution of clusters of 
galaxies across the universe. These epistemic projects each define a particular 
assessment context with respect to which the evaluation of competing theories, 
models, or hypotheses takes place. Looking more closely at these assessment 
contexts reveals that such a context provides additional informational structure 
beyond the ordinal information given by the epistemic values. To be more precise, 
evaluating a theory in light of the epistemic values in an assessment context allows 
introducing statements about whether a theory is sufficiently simple, accurate, 
consistent, fruitful or broad in scope to contribute to the realisation of a particular 
epistemic project. We assume that the assessment context provides enough 
informational structure beyond the ordinal information encoded in the epistemic 
values to assign a sufficiently fine-grained set of qualitative verdicts. 
To further motivate the plausibility of the move from ordinal information 
encoded in the criteria of theory evaluation to a cardinal scale, reconsider the case of 
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the committee. The members of the committee also transfer their ordinal assessment 
of proposals into a cardinal scale. How are they doing this? Following the previous 
line of reasoning, they are capable of doing this mentally challenging task, which 
involves a certain degree of imprecision or granulation, by implicitly making 
assumptions about the research setting at the university or in the discipline more 
broadly. Accordingly, they are judging whether a research proposal is sufficiently 
well-structured or highly original in view of the expectations of the profession, such 
as the prospect of producing work which could be published in a peer-reviewed 
journal.5 
Notice the work that the qualitative verdicts are doing. The qualitative verdicts 
stated in the rank scoring system impose a cardinal representation on the preference 
orderings over the alternative theories.6 It is this constructed cardinal representation 
which allows inter-criteria comparison and, hence, enables us to avoid the Arrovian 
impossibility result. In order to make the cardinal scores for each of the theories 
comparable across the set of criteria and thereby to achieve inter-criteria 
comparability, the process of construction of the scale is of utmost importance. This 
is analogous to establishing a common grammar or language that creates some 
unifying basis for comparison. 
In order to clarify more concretely our proposed approach, let us go back to the 
committee and its members again. Each individual has to transform his or her ordinal 
preference relation over the alternative proposals into a cardinal ranking with the 
                                                          
5  Let us add two further clarifications to our motivation for a move from the ordinal to the cardinal 
world. First, note that the informational content of the assessment context (i.e. the broad epistemic 
projects and its features) need to be distinct from the epistemic values. If this informational content 
were identical to the Kuhnian epistemic values or could be rephrased in terms of additional 
epistemic values, then, given our problem set-up, it would only provide ordinal information and, 
hence, we would not be able to justify the move to a cardinal scale in this way. Secondly, let us 
emphasize that we do not presuppose that the epistemic values directly provide cardinal 
information. Rather, we assume an additional and mentally challenging step by the scientist which 
involves the careful consideration of the assessment context of a theory choice problem. 
6  See Pivato (2014, 50) for a similar discussion of the possibility to impose cardinality on a ranking 
of alternatives. 
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requirement that if proposal 𝑥, let us say, is at least as good as proposal 𝑦, the 
cardinal rank or score attached to 𝑥 is at least as high as the rank assigned to 𝑦 so that 
for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋, the following relationship holds: 𝑥𝑅𝑦 ↔  𝑠(𝑥) ≥  𝑠(𝑦), where 𝑠(𝑥) 
stands for the cardinal value or score attached to 𝑥, and likewise for 𝑦. This is a very 
basic requirement in the sense that one must neither lose nor distort ordinal 
information when one makes a transition from the ordinal to the cardinal world. 
Furthermore, we postulate that score differences among the different alternatives are 
meaningful and comparable, so that for four alternatives 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑤, let us say, one 
may come to the conclusion that 𝑠𝑛(𝑥) – 𝑠𝑛(𝑦) > 𝑠𝑛(𝑧) – 𝑠𝑛(𝑤), where 𝑠𝑛(𝑥), for 
example, is the score assigned to alternative 𝑥 by committee member 𝑛. Note that 
any affine transformation of these scores with a common positive scale factor over 
all n does not destroy this comparison of score differences. 
Coming back to our problem of theory comparison, each scientist is assumed to 
examine the given theories in the light of the set of criteria that are relevant for the 
problem at stake. More precisely, each scientist starts for each single criterion with 
an ordinal ranking over the theories to be evaluated and then transforms this ranking 
into a sequence of cardinal scores according to the specified relationship from above. 
We assume that the scientist can translate the ordinal into the cardinal information 
for every epistemic value in isolation. Accordingly, assigning an alternative 𝑥 a rank 
score with respect to simplicity, let us say, is independent from assigning 𝑥 a rank 
score with respect to accuracy, for example. This involves the assumption that the 
epistemic values are independent of each other. We think that this is, first, in line 
with Kuhn’s discussion and, secondly, even if there are (conceptual or empirical) 
dependency relations between the values, these relations might not hold under all 
possible interpretations of these values which should be considered when one 
discusses theory choice on this level of abstraction. 
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The result we get is attractive. Given a finite number of epistemic values and 
three or more alternative theories, the proposed aggregation method yields a 
complete and transitive ranking and the rule satisfies the four Arrovian conditions of 
unrestricted domain (U), weak Pareto (P), non-dictatorship (D), and independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (I) within a cardinal setting. We will show carefully how these 
results are achieved once we have formally specified our proposal (see section 4.3). 
Since the qualitative verdicts are establishing the inter-criteria comparability, 
let us motivate them further. First, the success of our solution does not depend on the 
particular formulation of qualitative verdicts we have introduced above. We can 
allow for a more fine-grained and less fine-grained set of qualitative verdicts. In 
addition, different formulations of the qualitative verdicts could be chosen for 
different areas in science. However, we take it to be the case that the following 
requirements have to be fulfilled by a plausible set of qualitative verdicts: a) the 
qualitative verdicts need to be framed in evaluative terms. The evaluative terms 
transport a substantial meaning which can be made sense of in the context of theory 
choice (e.g. a highly fruitful theory). Furthermore, using evaluative terms instead of 
going directly for the rank scores implies the commitment to justify the ascription of 
a particular evaluative term; b) the evaluative terms need to suggest a natural ranking 
amongst them; c) the evaluative terms need to make sense with respect to every 
epistemic value under consideration. 
We should mention that the idea to introduce qualitative verdicts and thereby 
establish a common language or “grammar” was made before by Balinski and Laraki 
(2007, 2010). Their proposal of preference aggregation, called majority judgment, 
however, completely remains within the framework of ordinal information and 
therefore systematically differs from our own approach. 
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Second, let us provide some plausibility for the claim that our five qualitative 
verdicts ‘very high’, ‘high’, ‘satisfactory’, ‘just sufficient’, and ‘insufficient’ are 
indeed applicable to the five Kuhnian epistemic values. From our point of view, it is 
fairly obvious that accuracy, scope, fruitfulness and simplicity can be fulfilled to a 
greater or lesser extent. It is less obvious for consistency. Under the heading of this 
epistemic value, Kuhn discusses internal consistency (i.e. the theory is free of any 
contradictions) and external consistency (i.e. the theory does not contradict already 
accepted theories) (Kuhn 1977, 321). We accommodate internal and external 
consistency in our set of qualitative verdicts as follows: If the theory contains no 
contradictions and does not entail contradictions with already existing theories, it 
receives the verdict ‘very high’, otherwise it receives the verdict ‘insufficient’. 
Accordingly, we treat ‘consistency’ as a matter of binary choice.7 
Thirdly, the talk about theory choice problems in an assessment context 
introduces rather straightforwardly a notion of context-dependency. Let us be very 
clear what dependency relations we have in mind here. 
In our framework, the graininess of the partition can vary between assessment 
contexts. Furthermore, the prerequisites in order to assign the qualitative verdict of 
‘sufficient’, let us say, to a particular theory can vary among the epistemic values and 
may depend on the assessment context. What is important, however, is that if the 
scientist has come to the conclusion that two criteria are sufficiently fulfilled with 
respect to any particular theory or across two or more theories, then, simply said, 
‘sufficient means sufficient’. Otherwise, the inter-criterion comparability would not 
                                                          
7  Notice that we do not treat the qualitative verdict ‘insufficient’ as an eliminative verdict in the sense 
that whenever with respect to one epistemic value an alternative gets an ‘insufficient’ verdict, this 
alternative is eliminated from the choice set. The reason for this is that we, in line with Kuhn, do 
not share the intuition that one of the epistemic values should be treated as a killer criterion. 
Accordingly, even if a theory is insufficiently simple, let us say, but receives the best qualitative 
verdicts with respect to all other criteria such that the aggregate rank score is the highest of all 
alternatives, the low grade in terms of simplicity has to be seen in relation to the high grades 
obtained from the other criteria. 
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be given. Admittedly, it is a rather complicated mental exercise that we expect the 
scientist to perform. For example, the scientist may have reasons to say that the 
requirements to assert that sufficiency is given, may be quite high in relation to one 
criterion but less rigorous with respect to another criterion. But once sufficiency (of 
fulfilment) is registered or stated by two or several criteria, it has the same meaning 
everywhere and enters, via its constructed cardinal representation, directly as input 
into the aggregation function. 
We acknowledge that these claims are fairly abstract. We will illustrate them in 
section 4.4 with the help of hypothetical examples. But first, we provide a precise 
formal discussion of the aggregation rule we just have introduced. 
 
4.3 A formal characterisation of our solution 
 
The following formal presentation is based on Gaertner and Xu’s (2012) 
characterisation. Let 𝑋 be the universal set of scientific theories containing a finite 
number of elements. Let 𝑁 be the set of criteria deemed relevant with 𝑡 > 1. Let 𝐸 =
 {1, … , 𝐸}, with the cardinality of this set being larger than one, be a set of given 
positive integers from 1 to 𝐸. These integers will in most cases be assumed to be 
equally distanced and are thought to represent qualitative statements thus constituting 
a common language of evaluation, as outlined above.8 
A scoring function 𝑠𝑖: 𝑋 →  𝐸 is chosen for each criterion 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, such that, for 
all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑠𝑖(𝑥) indicates the score that criterion 𝑖 assigns to 𝑥. Let 𝑆𝑖 be the set of all 
possible scoring functions for criterion 𝑖. As explained in the last section, the 
                                                          
8  In general, the required minimal level of graininess depends on the particular theory choice 
problem at hand. However, if one criterion (𝑖) ranks all alternative theories in a strict order, then 
due to 𝑥𝑃𝑖𝑦 ↔  𝑠𝑖(𝑥) > 𝑠𝑖(𝑦), the minimal level of graininess is the number of alternative theories. 
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statement how well or how badly a theory fares given in light of a criterion has to be 
inserted in the commonly given scale constituted by set 𝐸. 
Let 𝑃 be the set of all orderings over 𝑋. A profile 𝑠 =  (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑡) is a list of 
scoring functions, one for each criterion. An aggregation rule 𝑓 is defined as a 
mapping: 𝑆1 × … × 𝑆𝑡  →  𝑃. Let 𝑆 =  𝑆1 × … × 𝑆𝑡. 
𝑓 is said to be an 𝐸-based scoring rule, to be denoted by 𝑓𝐸 , iff, for any 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 
and any 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋, it is the case that 
𝑥 ≿  𝑦 ⇔  ∑ 𝑠𝑖(𝑥)
𝑖∈𝑁
 ≥  ∑ 𝑠𝑖(𝑦)
𝑖∈𝑁
 
where ≿ =  𝑓(𝑠). The asymmetric and symmetric parts of ≿ will be denoted by 
≻ and ~, respectively.9 
We are now in the position to articulate precisely how the Arrovian conditions 
U, D, I, and P are fulfilled. 
Our aggregation procedure does not restrict the set of possible binary relations 
𝑅𝑛 over the alternative theories. Hence, unrestricted domain (U) is satisfied. The 
Pareto condition (P) is satisfied quite naturally. If all epistemic values find 𝑇1, let us 
say, better than 𝑇2, then according to our earlier relationship that 𝑥 𝑅 𝑦 ↔  𝑠(𝑥)  ≥
 𝑠(𝑦) and 𝑥 𝑃 𝑦 ↔  𝑠(𝑥)  >  𝑠(𝑦), respectively, the Pareto condition requires that 𝑇1 
is better than 𝑇2 in the “world” of cardinal information. Furthermore, the non-
dictatorship (D) requirement states that there is no epistemic value such that if it 
ranks 𝑇1 above 𝑇2, 𝑇1 is ranked automatically above 𝑇2 in the overall ranking. This is 
satisfied by our general scoring rule because the general scoring rule weights the 
rank scores of each criterion equally.10 Finally, the independence of irrelevant 
                                                          
9  This E-based scoring function can be characterised in a fairly simple way. Please see the Appendix 
for a formal characterisation. 
10  Our approach can allow different weights of the epistemic values. A natural way to account for this 
difference is to divide a criterion (e.g. ‘fruitfulness’) into two sub-criteria (e.g. ‘fruitfulness with 
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alternatives (I) requirement means that the overall ranking of 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 depends only 
on how the epistemic values rank 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 and not on how they rank other 
alternatives. Our proposed aggregation procedure satisfies condition I reformulated 
within the cardinal context.11 Verbally, it requires that if two theories 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 
receive precisely the same rank scores from the different epistemic values in the case 
of two separate evaluations, then the aggregate judgment over 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 is identical 
between the two evaluations. Given this set-up, it is irrelevant for the aggregate 
ranking of 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 how other theories are evaluated in the two evaluations. Let us 
illustrate the cardinal version of the independence condition with the help of a simple 
example. Consider the following two evaluations of three theories 𝑇1, 𝑇2 and 𝑇3 
based on three epistemic values where the ranks or scores in the left column are 
embedded in a simple integer-valued, equally-spaced interval scale: 
 
 
4    
3 𝑇1 𝑇3 𝑇3 
2 𝑇2 𝑇1 𝑇2 
1 𝑇3 𝑇2 𝑇1 
0    
 
According to our general scoring function, in the first evaluation 𝑇1 (with an 
associated total rank score 6) is strictly preferred to 𝑇2 (having an associated total 
rank score 5). The exact scores with respect to 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 are precisely retained in the 
second evaluation. As this is the case, the aggregate relations between the two 
theories are exactly the same in the two evaluations despite the fact that an irrelevant 
alternative (here 𝑇3) is positioned differently in the two situations. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
respect to the discipline’ and ‘fruitfulness with respect to neighbouring disciplines’). In this way, 
the initial criterion gets, quite naturally, a higher weight in our summation procedure. 
11  A discussion of the reformulated version of the independence requirement in the context of the 
utilitarian rule can be found in Gaertner (2013, 125-126). 
4 𝑻𝟑 𝑻𝟑  
3 𝑇1   
2 𝑇2 𝑇1 𝑇2 
1  𝑇2 𝑇1 
0   𝑻𝟑 
Evaluation 1 Evaluation 2 
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Furthermore, the suggested aggregation procedure is sensitive towards the 
degree of criteria fulfilment. This is, in social choice theory, denoted as a form of 
positive responsiveness or positive association in the sense that a unilateral change in 
the fulfilment of some criterion in favour of 𝑥, let us say, should be reflected on the 
aggregate level in the same and not in the opposite direction. 
The model also satisfies a property that is sometimes called consistency, at 
other times reinforcement (Young, 1974), demanding that if the set of criteria is split 
up into two parts and a certain theory wins in both subsets, then this theory must also 
win in relation to the complete set of criteria. 
Finally, it seems to us that the method proposed is superior to the Borda rule. 
While the latter rule requires that each and every criterion rank the alternative 
theories in a linear order, such a high degree of uniformity is not demanded by the 
method proposed here. Different criteria can rank or rather assign scores to the given 
alternatives in completely different ways as explained previously. We consider this 
as an advantage since the single criterion has more flexibility ‘to articulate its 
preferences’, i.e., it has more flexibility to express to what degree or extent it finds 
itself represented among the various theories under consideration. 
 
4.4 Spelling out context-dependency in our proposal 
 
In this section, we provide further motivation for our proposal of shared 
qualitative verdicts in the context of theory evaluation. So far we have argued that 
the theory choice problem should be viewed in a cardinal context and that the 
qualitative verdicts can be imposed on all of the Kuhnian values (see section 4.2). 
Now we show that the set of qualitative verdicts allows for considerable flexibility 
by spelling out the element of context-dependency. We do this in two steps. First, we 
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motivate the claim that the level of graininess of the qualitative verdicts can vary 
among assessment contexts. Secondly, we argue that the prerequisites in order to 
reach a particular qualitative verdict can change across epistemic values and 
assessment contexts. 
To start, think about the following two hypothetical examples of assessment 
contexts. Martina, a particle physicist at the CERN, the European Organisation for 
Nuclear Research, evaluates two theories about the structure of the decay of Higg’s 
Bosons. Tom, a sociologist, evaluates two theories about the causes of the recent 
increase in immigration to the United Kingdom. Martina and Tom are each using the 
five Kuhnian values to reach an overall ranking of theories. They impose a set of 
qualitative verdicts on their ordinal preferences for each criterion. To do this, 
Martina and Tom might be using different sets of qualitative verdicts. Martina might 
work, in light of the small differences in the content of the theories and the necessary 
precision of the predictive tasks, with a five-item scale. In contrast, Tom might be 
using a three-item scale which is appropriate to deal with the recent aggregate data 
on immigration flows. 
Let us turn to the prerequisites to reach a particular qualitative verdict. Assume 
that Martina is using the following verdicts: ‘very high’, ‘high’, ‘sufficient’, ‘just 
sufficient’, and ‘insufficient’. When she assigns the competing theories to the 
qualitative verdicts, she reviews the ordinal information provided by every epistemic 
value. Now, to do this pairing of theories and verdicts it is, as we asserted earlier in 
section 4.2, absolutely necessary that a qualitative verdict (e.g. ‘insufficient’) means 
the same for every epistemic value. The prerequisites to reach a particular qualitative 
verdict can, however, be quite different. With respect to accuracy, for example, 
‘high’ could refer to a specific number of decimals at which the prediction of a 
theory matches the data. With respect to simplicity, ‘high’ could denote the fact that 
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a theory allows stating the key differential equation for the system under study in 
closed form. The same could be argued for the other qualitative verdicts. 
What about the prerequisites to reach a particular verdict in different 
assessment contexts? Assume that Tom and Martina are using the same set of 
verdicts, as specified in the previous paragraph. Furthermore, assume that both of 
them are attaching the verdict ‘high’ to one of their theories with respect to accuracy. 
Since their application contexts (particle physics vs. sociology) differ substantially, 
the reasoning behind the respective verdicts can differ. Martina could interpret it as a 
specific number of decimals at which the prediction of a theory matches the data. In 
contrast, Tom could refer to the fact that one of his theories is able to reflect 
qualitatively what people have reported in narrative interviews. 
 
5. Aggregation across scientists 
What we have described in the last section essentially is an aggregation 
procedure to which an individual scientist may resort in order to establish an ordering 
over a number of competing theories that satisfy a given set of epistemic values in 
different ways or to a different degree. Different scientists will normally come up 
with different orderings over the theories to be evaluated. Kuhn (1977, 325) writes 
that “every individual choice between competing theories depends on a mixture of 
objective and subjective factors, or of shared and individual criteria” so that the 
construction of a unique algorithm for theory choice is very difficult, if not 
impossible. He went on saying that  
 
“(…) I have conceded that each individual has an algorithm and that all their 
algorithms have much in common. Nevertheless, I continue to hold that the 
algorithms of individuals are all ultimately different by virtue of the subjective 
considerations with which each must complete the objective criteria before any 
computations can be done.” (ibid., 329, our italics) 
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The interesting aspect of our formal approach is that each and every scientist 
can have his or her own scoring function in order to generate an ordering over 
alternative theories. But not only this. Different scientists could choose different 
degrees of graininess with respect to qualitative verdicts. One person could have 
three verdicts, let us say ‘high’, ‘sufficient’ and ‘insufficient’, another person could 
decide just to pick two verdicts, namely ‘high’ and ‘insufficient’. If this is the case, 
the two scientists can come up with different rankings of the theories, as in the 
following example. 
Consider Anna and Peter, two scientists who evaluate two theories 𝑇1 and 






Rank scores  
Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 
high 3 𝑇1   
sufficient 2  𝑇2 𝑇2 






Rank scores  
Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 
high 2 𝑇1 𝑇2 𝑇2 
insufficient 1 𝑇2 𝑇1 𝑇1 
 
Notice that in terms of purely ordinal information, Anna and Peter reveal the same 
preference ordering. Using our scoring procedure, Peter strictly prefers 𝑇2 over 𝑇1 
whereas Anna is indifferent between 𝑇1 and 𝑇2. 
As can be seen, Anna and Peter assign 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 to different qualitative 
verdicts. Reasons for their disagreement in the assignment of qualitative verdicts 
might be that Anna and Peter interpret the qualitative verdicts differently and/or that 
they interpret the epistemic values in a different way, explanations which come close 
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to the point of subjectivity that Kuhn was making in the quotations at the beginning 
of this section. 
All this can happen. A person may never assign the grade ‘very good’ – for this 
person ‘good’ is the best ever. Another person may be easily satisfied and, therefore, 
assign the grade ‘very good’ quite often. As we stated before, once the grades have 
been assigned, they have to be taken at face value. One should not come up asserting 
that the grade ‘good’ of one person is equivalent to the grade ‘very good’ of another 
person. We just simply lack this information. Such statements could become 
acceptable only under special circumstances where one has detailed information 
about the personality and psychology of different persons, which normally is not the 
case. 
Nevertheless, once an overall verdict among a group of different scientists is 
found necessary, there is need for a mechanism that aggregates across individual 
evaluations. 
The procedure put forward in this paper establishes, for each evaluating person, 
an ordinal ranking over the set of alternative theories at stake. Various methods are 
available to aggregate these orderings, all of which violate at least one of Arrow's 
requirements. The Borda rule is one candidate, approval voting (Brams and Fishburn 
1983) would be a second, plurality voting a third, Condorcet’s pairwise majority 
voting rule a fourth. Subsequently, we want to offer some considerations for why the 
Borda rule might be an appropriate procedure for the aggregation across different 
scientists. 
To start, notice that it does not make sense to use our general scoring rule at 
this stage. To do so, would be asking the scientists to use a set of qualitative verdicts 
to transform their ordinal rankings into cardinal information. However, this would 
amount to saying that the scientists need to go back to their individual assessment of 
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the alternative theories instead of taking the outcome of this analysis at face value. 
Furthermore, the Borda method has an advantage in relation to plurality and approval 
voting, namely, its aggregation procedure uses a lot of positional information that 
both plurality and approval voting ignore. While the plurality rule restricts itself to 
using information on the top element within each person's evaluation only so that the 
ranking of all other options is ignored, approval voting implicitly constructs two 
indifference classes, the set of acceptable options and the set of unacceptable 
alternatives, with no further differentiation in either set. Finally, the Borda method 
might be preferred to Condorcet’s pairwise majority voting since the former 
guarantees that we never get a cyclical ranking of the alternative theories on the level 
of the scientific community. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we proposed to avoid Arrow’s impossibility result in the realm of 
multi-criteria theory choice by making use of a general scoring function. We have 
shown that a cardinal description of the problem of theory choice can be motivated 
and that based on this a set of qualitative verdicts can be brought into play which 
allow arriving at a complete and transitive relationship over the alternative theories 
without violating unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, weak Pareto, and 
independence of irrelevant alternatives in a cardinal context. In a final step of the 
paper we argued that our solution can capture Kuhn’s statements about the role of 
subjective factors in the theory choice process. We claimed that if the scientists who 
are involved in the evaluation procedure agree on a common set of qualitative 
verdicts, an aggregate ranking of the alternative theories can be achieved. We briefly 
discussed the Borda rule as a fruitful method of aggregating the rankings across 
different scientists. 
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We stated clearly that our proposal should not be read as a descriptively 
accurate account of how theory choice is done in the sciences. We take it to be an 
interesting and open question how the proposed solution can be linked to actual 
scientific practice. Answers to this question will also allow to flesh out the 
implications of our proposal for the rationality of science; an issue which we have 
deliberately set aside here. In the context of the Arrovian impossibility, we believe 
that the proposed solution is a promising step forward. 
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Appendix 
 
To formally characterise the E-based scoring function, we need to introduce 
three concepts: (𝑖, 𝑗)-variance, a monotonicity condition, and the property of 
cancellation independence.12 
For any 𝑠, 𝑠′ ∈ 𝑆, any 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈  𝑁, and any 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈  𝑋, we say that 𝑠 and 𝑠′ are 
(𝑖, 𝑗)-variant with respect to (𝑥, 𝑦) if 𝑠𝑘(𝑥)  =  𝑠
′
𝑘(𝑥) and 𝑠𝑘(𝑦)  =  𝑠
′
𝑘(𝑦) for all 
𝑘 ∈  𝑁 \ {𝑖, 𝑗}. 
Let us now introduce two properties of an aggregation rule 𝑓. 
 
Monotonicity (M). For all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 and all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈  𝑋, if 𝑠𝑖(𝑥)  ≥  𝑠𝑖(𝑦) for all  
𝑖 ∈  𝑁, then 𝑥 ≿ 𝑦 and if 𝑠𝑖(𝑥)  ≥  𝑠𝑖(𝑦) for all 𝑖 ∈  𝑁 and 𝑠𝑗(𝑥) >  𝑠𝑗(𝑦) for 
some 𝑗 ∈  𝑁, then 𝑥 ≻ 𝑦. 
 
Condition M is a simple vector dominance condition. It requires that, in 
ranking two theories 𝑥 and 𝑦, if the score assigned to 𝑥 by each criterion i ∈ N is at 
least as great as the score assigned to 𝑦 by the same criterion 𝑖, then 𝑥 must be 
ranked at least as high as 𝑦 by the evaluating scientist, and if in addition, some 
criterion assigns a higher score to 𝑥 than to 𝑦, then 𝑥 must be ranked higher than 𝑦. 
 
Cancellation Independence (CI). For all 𝑠, 𝑠′ ∈ 𝑆, all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 and all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈  𝑁, if 
𝑠 and 𝑠′ are (𝑖, 𝑗)-variant with respect to (𝑥, 𝑦), 𝑠𝑖 (𝑥) − 𝑠𝑖 (𝑦)  = 𝑎, 𝑠𝑗  (𝑦) −
𝑠𝑗  (𝑥)  = 𝑏, 𝑠
′
𝑖(𝑥)  = 𝑠𝑖(𝑥), 𝑠
′
𝑗(𝑦)  =  𝑠𝑗(𝑦), 𝑠
′
𝑖(𝑦)  =  𝑠𝑖(𝑦)  +  𝛾 and 
𝑠′𝑗(𝑥)  =  𝑠𝑗(𝑥)  +  𝛾 where 𝛾 =  𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑎, 𝑏) when 𝑎 ≥  0 and 𝑏 ≥  0 and 𝛾 =
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑎, 𝑏) when 𝑎 <  0 and 𝑏 <  0, then 𝑥 ≿ 𝑦 ↔ 𝑥 ≿′ 𝑦, where ≿ =  𝑓(𝑠) 
and ≿′ =  𝑓(𝑠′). 
                                                          
12  See Pivato (2014) for an alternative axiomatic characterisation of this scoring function. 
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Condition CI makes use of the fact that for any pair of alternatives, rank 
differences of opposite sign can be reduced without changing the aggregate outcome 
of the ranking procedure. This reduction procedure is performed in a stepwise 
fashion, starting with any two theories 𝑥 and 𝑦, let us say, and picking any two 
criteria whose rank differences for 𝑥 and 𝑦 are of opposite sign. The "net" rank 
difference between 𝑥 and 𝑦 for this pair of criteria is determined. Then another 
criterion is picked whose rank difference for 𝑥 and 𝑦 is opposite in sign to the net 
rank difference of the first two criteria. The new net rank difference for 𝑥 and 𝑦 is 
calculated and the next criterion is picked whose rank difference again is opposite in 
sign to the just determined net rank difference with respect to 𝑥 and 𝑦, if there is still 
one such criterion, and so on. 
In Condition CI, vectors 𝑠 and 𝑠′ define scoring profiles that are aggregate-
rank equivalent with respect to any pair of scientific theories. We call 𝑠′ an  
𝑠-reduced scoring profile. Condition CI therefore requires that 𝑓(𝑠) and 𝑓(𝑠′) order 
any 𝑥 and 𝑦 in exactly the same way. Note that Condition CI makes an implicit 
assumption about an inter-criterion comparison of scores for which a common 
language is required. 
 
Theorem. 𝑓 = 𝑓𝐸  if and only if 𝑓 satisfies the properties of Monotonicity and 
Cancellation Independence. 
 
A proof of this result can be found in Gaertner and Xu (2012). 
The theorem above establishes, for each evaluating person, an ordering over 
the set of alternative theories if that person has consented to a common language. 
